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of origin and lack of cumulation limit effective market access). In addition, the rest of Europe, 
including Turkey, is integrating at a faster pace to create a Wider European Economic Space. 
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Balkans and Russia and the Ukraine.  
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1.  Introduction 
Economic integration is an integral element of the Barcelona process and is perceived as a key 
mechanism for stimulating trade and investment and raising growth rates in the Mediterranean 
region. To date, however, integration initiatives have not been effective in delivering these 
goals. Growth has at best been sluggish, with the growth rate in the region over the past 
decade averaging less than 1%, and little progress has been made in addressing poverty, with 
per capita income rising by only 0.5% per annum on average since 1975.  
The Mediterranean countries are characterised by relatively small markets, which entails that 
exports must be the key factor behind future growth. The EU is the main trading partner, 
accounting for almost 50% of imports and exports of the region as a whole and as much as 
70% for countries such as Tunisia (see Annex 1 for details). Exports to the EU have increased 
during the 1990s, by a factor of around 1.4, but at a much slower rate than other regions, most 
notably the other region bordering the EU which has been transformed during the last decade, 
Central and Eastern Europe, whose exports grew by a factor of more than 5. It is often noted 
that the economic structures of countries in the Mediterranean region are very similar which is 
deemed to be a major constraint on intra-regional trade. Inflows of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), an important driver of exports and growth in the Central and Eastern European 
countries, have been very small in the Mediterranean. In 2000, for example, the region as a 
whole received only 18% of the inflows into Central and Eastern Europe. FDI as a proportion 
of GDP is around 1%, which registers as one of the lowest rates in the world.
1   
This paper briefly reviews the current state of play in the Barcelona process before assessing 
what is missing and what should form the core economic substance of a programme for 
liberalisation and growth in the region. We then proceed to consider the geography of future 
agreements and how these can be designed to more effectively engender and entrench a 
commitment to region-wide economic integration.  
2.  Pushing the Barcelona Process Forward 
The current situation in the Mediterranean might be best described as one of plodding along. 
A large amount of time and energy has, and is being spent in negotiating trade agreements 
that will at best have a minor economic impact.  The Barcelona process is characterised by a 
family of limited bilateral free trade agreements. They are limited by lack of coverage: 
agriculture and services are effectively excluded. They are limited by lack of depth: 
substantial (and probably increasing) technical barriers to trade remain due to differences in 
regulatory requirements and the need to duplicate testing and conformity assessment when 
selling in overseas markets. They are also limited by rules: restrictive rules of origin and lack 
of cumulation constrain the degree of effective market access. 
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A re-appraisal of the process of integration between the EU and the Barcelona countries and 
between these countries themselves is required now:  
•  Firstly because the current process of limited improvements in market access for industrial 
goods and selected agricultural products has failed to significantly stimulate growth, 
serious consideration must be given to achieving genuine improvements in market access 
throughout the region and to broadening and deepening the whole integration process in 
the region. 
•  Secondly, the rest of Europe, including Turkey is integrating at a fast pace to create a 
Wider European Economic Space.
2 If nothing is done to invigorate the integration process 
in the Mediterranean, then the region will fall (further) behind relative to other regions on 
the periphery of Europe, such as the Balkans and Russia and Ukraine. The Wider 
European Economic Space is being defined not only in terms of standard market access 
for goods but also in breadth in terms of covering services and in depth in the sense that 
key regulatory issues such as health and safety standards and sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards are addressed. As we discuss in more detail below, effective modern trade 
agreements must inevitably cover services and standards. These, will, for example, be 
integral elements of forthcoming EU agreements with Russia and Ukraine. 
How then can the Barcelona process be re-invigorated. We separately identify two main 
aspects. Firstly, the core economic substance that is required for liberalisation and growth. 
Secondly, the geography of successful agreements to achieve these primary economic 
objectives. 
3.  The Core Economic Substance for Liberalisation and Growth 
Immediate implementation of effective liberalisation of agriculture 
Agriculture remains a key sector in many of the Mediterranean countries and agricultural 
exports are often an important source of foreign currency. Agriculture is subject to a high 
degree of distortion throughout the region which severely constrains intra-regional trade flows 
and specialisation. The principal overseas market is the EU. The benefits of free trade 
agreements with the EU are limited by the special status accorded to agriculture. For many of 
the countries in the region, exports of key agricultural products to the EU remain constrained 
by tariff barriers.
3 Not only are the barriers on unprocessed agriculture products high, but 
tariff escalation in the EU remains an important constraint upon the development of processed 
food sectors in the Mediterranean countries. Continuing restrictions on access to the EU 
market for agricultural products are the most important constraint on exports for many 
countries in the region (Chaherli and El-Said, 2000).   
Thus, a key element in promoting trade and growth in the Mediterranean region will be the 
liberalisation of barriers to basic and processed agricultural products. However, a region-wide 
approach to this issue is required since countries in the region appear to have comparative 
advantages in similar agricultural products (such as fruit and vegetables), so that bilateral 
liberalisation at different speeds could lead to substantial trade diversion. Also of importance 
in the context of market access in agricultural products is the issue of sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards and the difficulties that exporters face in accessing both the EU and 
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3 Annex 3 shows the five main agricultural exports from each of the Mediterranean countries to the EU and the 
current level of EU tariff protection facing those commodities. Annex 4 shows the current structure of 
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neighbouring markets. Simply removing tariff barriers may not deliver effective 
improvements in market access if products in the Mediterranean region are unable to satisfy 
EU requirements concerning risk assessment mechanisms, pest detection and eradication 
procedures and the system of quarantine. At issue here is the fact that the standards applied by 
the Mediterranean countries are different from those of the EU so that producers who wish to 
export have to satisfy different standards for different markets. This is also a feature of trade 
between the Mediterranean countries themselves. We return to the issue of product 
regulations later but conclude here that long-run growth in agricultural exports to the EU will 
have to be underpinned by a programme of upgrading sanitary and phytosanitary standards in 
the region and the mechanisms to ensure compliance with those standards. 
Move quickly towards the effective liberalisation of services.  
It is becoming increasingly recognised that services play an integral role in economic 
advancement and that their exclusion from liberalisation is likely to severely constrain the 
benefits that are available from the integration of other sectors such as manufacturing. To be 
blunt, inefficient provision of key services, such as finance, telecommunications and 
transport,  limits economic growth. In this section we briefly discuss the economic reasoning 
and empirical studies that should propel discussions concerning the liberalisation of services 
to the forefront of discussions about integration in the Mediterranean.  
Inefficient domestic production of services protected behind trade and investment barriers acts 
as a tax on the production of goods. Many industrial sectors in Mediterranean countries may 
well be  currently facing negative rates of effective protection since whilst tariffs on industrial 
goods are being removed with the principal trading partner (the EU), constraints remain 
which raise the price of service inputs. In other words, the liberalisation of markets for goods 
in the absence of services liberalisation can lead to negative rates of effective protection of 
goods and hence the need for parallel liberalisation of goods and services (Mattoo et al. 
(2001)). This means that there will be no incentive to increase the output of a goods sector 
that is not receiving protection but where the services that it uses are protected. The protection 
of services raises their price in the domestic economy and so too the costs of the industries 
that rely on them. Indeed, the liberalisation of services may be necessary for industrial sectors 
to be able to fully benefit from the direct opportunities that are made available by the removal 
of trade barriers.  
The above paragraph stresses the importance of services liberalisation in improving the 
efficiency of use of existing resources. There is a growing literature that links services to 
economic growth. Just as with trade in goods, liberalisation of trade in services can lead to 
technology transfer and technology spillovers. These can arise both through cross-border 
provision of services and through foreign direct investment to establish commercial presence. 
Such technology transfer will be the source of additional growth.  
There is one key difference that distinguishes services from goods liberalisation, in terms of 
their impact on growth. Services liberalisation often implies a larger scale of activity in the 
domestic economy which provides greater scope for the growth-enhancing characteristics that 
are present in many service sectors, such as learning by doing and knowledge generation, 
raising product variety and product quality (Mattoo et al. (2001)). This larger scale of activity 
arises because for many services the simultaneity of production and consumption makes a 
local presence necessary in order to supply the market. This requires factors of production to 
move to the consuming country. Further, many barriers in services sectors constrain entry to 
the market, not just to foreign entrants but also to new domestic providers. Hence, the 
liberalisation of services sectors can result in more competition from both foreign and new  B RENTON AND MANCHIN 
 4 
domestic firms, which implies a larger scale of activity. It is also worth noting that since 
services are often labour-intensive, this greater scale of activity can play an important role in 
absorbing workers released as trade protection of import-competing goods is reduced and in 
attacking general unemployment. 
Within the services sector, particular attention is often given to financial services due to the 
role that they play in directing investment funds to the most productive uses and in so doing 
providing for growth of output and incomes. Financial systems also play other important roles 
that can affect efficiency and growth (Levine (1997)). These functions comprise the trading 
and pooling of risk, the collection and dissemination of information concerning different 
investment opportunities and the monitoring of managerial performance and hence the means 
and incentives for improved corporate control, the mobilisation of savings through the 
provision of innovative financial instruments and the facilitation of trade in goods and 
services through the provision and maintenance of payment systems. If liberalisation of 
financial services leads to higher savings and investment and/or the more productive use of 
capital, then a higher level of per capita income will result. Growth rates will increase during 
the transition period to this higher level of income, but ultimately growth will return to its 
equilibrium rate. Permanently higher growth rates will occur if financial liberalisation leads to 
faster innovation in the financial sector or engenders processes such as learning by doing.  
A number of studies have demonstrated the importance of the depth of financial markets for 
economic growth (King and Levine (1993) and Barthelemy and Varoudakis (1995)), although 
the role of policy and the impact of trade in financial services are not clarified. More recently, 
Francois and Schuknecht (1999) postulate a causal link from liberalisation of trade in services 
to performance in financial sectors and economic growth. Trade liberalisation promotes 
competition and higher quality financial services through entry. In an empirical exercise they 
find that moving from closed financial markets to a more open financial system increases the 
degree of competition in the provision of financial services which is associated with a higher 
growth rate. Mattoo et al. (2001) find that countries with open financial and 
telecommunications sectors have tended to grow faster than less-open countries by as much as 
1.5 percentage points.  
It is worth noting that constraints upon trade in services are often prohibitive, so that 
preferential trade liberalisation cannot cause actual trade diversion – there is no trade to 
divert. In addition, there will not be a loss of tariff revenue since the main barriers to trade are 
regulatory barriers, which do not generate revenue for the government. In this case a regional 
trade agreement could only cause ‘potential’ trade diversion in the sense that potential 
additional gains from non-preferential liberalisation are foregone. 
Compared to the Association Agreements with the Central and Eastern European applicant 
countries, the EU’s agreements with Mediterranean countries typically cover services in a 
much more limited way. Whilst the Association Agreements with the CEECs cover 
movement of workers, establishment and supply of services, the agreements with the 
Mediterranean countries are in most cases limited to the multilateral obligations offered under 
the GATS, particularly to grant reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment in the services 
sectors covered by that obligation. Although the agreements with Tunisia, Israel, Morocco 
aim to ‘widen the scope of the Agreement to cover the right of establishment of firms’ and the 
liberalisation of the provision of services, the method of the implementation of this objective 
is not set in the agreements; instead, ‘the Association Council shall make the necessary 
recommendations for the implementation of the objective’.   T RADE POLICY ISSUES FOR THE EURO-MED PARTNERSHIP 
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Table 1 shows the importance of trade in services in total commercial transactions with the 
Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs). The share of EU exports of goods was 78% in 2000 
while the share of services in EU exports represented only 13% of the total. For EU imports,  
current account debit, the share of goods represents a smaller share, 64%, while EU imports 
of services comprise 20%. There is an important difference in the composition of services in 
EU exports and imports with the Mediterranean countries. Whilst transportation and travel has 
only a slightly higher share than other services, such as finance, in exports, in imports 77% of 
services comprise travel and transportation while only 23% of imports are other services. 
Furthermore, while there was an increase in exports of other services relative to transport and 
travel services since 1992, the composition of imports of services remained stable.  
Table 1. EU current transactions with the MPCs* (millions of euro) 
   1992 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Credit Current  account  39 237 44 474 53 632 63 163 66 107  67 447  83 172
 Goods
**  29 124 33 622 41 367 48 347 51 770  51 070  64 459
 Services  4 897 6 527 6 641 8 930 9 120  9 466  10 909
     Transportation  1 694 1 866 1 759 2 462 2 260  2 120  2 727
     Travel  987 1 118 1 882 2 340 2 419  2 542  3 076
     Other services  1 922 3 271 2 930 4 101 4 419  4 803  5 104
     Serv. not alloc.  294 272 70 28 22 2 2
 Income  4 753 4 033 4 713 4 942 4 335  6 037  6 893
 Current  transfers  206 290 909 941 880 875 912
Debit Current  account  40 099 42 433 49 676 56 344 56 565  60 142  78 768
 Goods
**  24 629 24 952 28 417 32 668 33 927  35 960  50 718
 Services  8 389 9 245 10 819 12 641 12 223  12 735  15 597
     Transportation  2 542 2 997 2 877 3 525 3 381  3 653  4 403
     Travel  3 947 4 106 5 548 6 026 5 755  6 008  7 542
     Other services  1 808 2 043 2 358 3 057 3 046  3 075  3 651
     Serv. not alloc.  94 97 36 34 42 0 1
 Income  2 069 2 638 4 470 5 078 4 577  5 390  6 083
 Current  transfers  4 986 5 594 5 970 5 955 5 837  6 060  6 371
Balance Current  account  -862 2 040 3 955 6 818 9 541  7 305  4 404
 Goods
**  4 494 8 670 12 950 15 679 17 844  15 110  13 741
 Services  -3 491 -2 718 -4 178 -3 711 -3 103  -3 269  -4 688
     Transportation  -848 -1 131 -1 119 -1 063 -1 121  -1 533  -1 676
     Travel  -2 960 -2 988 -3 666 -3 686 -3 336  -3 466  -4 466
     Other services  114 1 228 572 1 044 1 374  1 728  1 453
     Serv. not alloc.  201 175 35 -7 -20 2 1
 Income  2 683 1 395 243 -136 -241  648  810
 Current  transfers  -4 780 -5 304 -5 061 -5 015 -4 957  -5 185  -5 459
* Excluding Cyprus, Malta and Israel. 
** According to the Balance of Payments concept (exports FOB - imports FOB). 
Source: Eurostat (2002a). 
 
It is clear that there are substantial economic gains to be reaped from the effective 
liberalisation of services, in terms of both greater economic efficiency and potentially higher 
growth rates. Many services are important determinants of competitiveness (Hoekman and 
Messerlin (2002a)). With regard to the impact on efficiency, Hoekman and Konan (1999) find 
using a simulation model that a EU-Egypt free trade agreement limited to goods (but with 
substantial progress on removing regulatory barriers affecting goods sectors) could raise  B RENTON AND MANCHIN 
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welfare in Egypt by around 4% whilst an agreement which reduced barriers to services in 
Egypt could raise economic welfare by over 13%. 
Regional integration within the Mediterranean is currently governed by the GAFTA (Greater 
Arab Free Trade Area)
4 process which aims to have removed import barriers and other 
barriers to trade by 2008. However, the agreement is confined to trade in goods. Services and 
investment are excluded. As such, and given the limited scope for trade in goods between 
Mediterranean countries that many authors have stressed, the aggregate economic impact of 
the GAFTA will be slight. Indeed, economic modelling of the impact of intra-regional 
integration confined to trade in goods suggests that it would be very small for Tunisia and 
could be negative for Egypt (Hoekman and Messerlin (2002a)). This is not to suggest that 
there are no potential gains from removing border barriers to intra-regional trade in goods, but 
that these gains will be small relative to the liberalisation of trade in services and the removal 
of regulatory barriers to trade and that attaining the full benefits from removing border 
barriers will be dependent upon regulatory reform and liberalisation of services. For these 
reasons, Hoekman and Messerlin (2002a and b) propose a services-based integration strategy 
for the region. 
FDI and trade in services are also closely related. As noted above, the international provisions 
of many services often require some form of local presence. Further, access to efficiently 
provided services is often an important factor in determining the location decisions of 
multinational firms. In some sectors an efficient services sector is a pre-requisite for 
substantial inflows of FDI. Table 2 compares the evolution of the flow of overseas investment 
by EU companies in Central and Eastern European countries and in the Mediterranean 
countries during the period 1998-2000. Both total FDI flows and FDI flows per capita are 
significantly lower in the Mediterranean countries than in the Central and Eastern European 
countries. The large differences in terms of EU FDI flows between the two regions suggest a 
substantial potential for the Mediterranean region to attract further FDI. An important element 
in achieving this is likely to be the effective liberalisation of services sectors.  
Table 2. EU FDI flows to Central and Eastern European and Mediterranean countries 
  EU direct investment flows 
(millions of euro) 
EU direct investment flows per capita  
 1998  1999 2000 1998 1999  2000
CEECs  10 418  12 485 19 104 98.3 118.8  180.9
MPCs  2 563  1 320 5 020 21.0 10.8  37.6
CEECs: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovak 
Republic. 
MPCs: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. 
 
Finally, the discussion above has concentrated upon the economic benefits of liberalisation of 
key services in the Mediterranean countries domestic markets. In a number of sectors, such as 
telecommunications and finance, this will entail increased imports and FDI from EU countries 
whose service suppliers are relatively efficient. However, it is also very important that there 
be reciprocal opening of service markets in the EU for sectors where the Mediterranean 
countries are relatively efficient. So, if the EU is serious about achieving liberalisation of 
services in the region it will have to be bold and liberalise its market for the provision of low-
skilled labour-intensive services, such as construction, and allow the movement of persons to 
                                                           
4 See Zarrouk (2000).  T RADE POLICY ISSUES FOR THE EURO-MED PARTNERSHIP 
 7 
provide those services in the EU. It is crucial that the EU provides a strong lead by 
liberalising its own services markets and contributes to an environment that stimulates reform 
and liberalisation in the Mediterranean. An important issue to which we return later will be 
the liberalisation of trade in services between the EU and Turkey and the future role that 
Turkey will play, as a member of a customs union with the EU, in defining EU bilateral trade 
policy in services towards other countries in the region.  
Standards and integration 
Standards and regulations have come to be increasingly important factors in determining 
market access. Barriers to trade can arise from differences in the regulatory regimes imposed 
in various countries, which act to segment markets along national lines, constraining the 
ability of firms to effectively compete across national boundaries. The market-segmenting 
effects of these policies may not necessarily be intentional. For example, conformity with 
health, safety and technical standards requires testing and certification, which will normally 
be required of both domestic and imported products. But if every country maintains its own 
standards and testing procedures, then exported products will face a multiplicity of conformity 
assessment and hence higher compliance costs and this will tend to reduce international trade 
flows.  
Due to the reduction in traditional trade barriers, the world economy has become more 
integrated. This has been reflected in rising volumes of trade and investment flows and 
increasing international interdependencies between firms. The activities of multinational firms 
are now much more important and this is altering the political economy which envelops trade 
policy-making. A large proportion of trade is now intra-firm trade, that is, trade that takes 
place within multinational enterprises. More generally, there has been an increase in the 
extent to which firms outsource parts of the production process to overseas suppliers leading 
to a ‘sequential, vertical trading chain stretching across many countries’ (Hummels et al. 
(1999)). Thus, a key element in successfully integrating into regional and global markets is 
inclusion into regional production networks. Differences in national product standards and in 
certification constrain the development of regional production systems by making 
internationally integrated production more costly. The latter need to be based upon a clear and 
certain policy environment and one in which the regional market as a whole can be served 
without significant interference. This requires countries to go beyond the removal of tariffs 
and quotas on trade to embrace what has come to be called ‘deep integration’. The principal 
means or achieving deep integration, and so increasing the degree of competition, are the 
harmonisation of regulations and the mutual recognition of regulatory policy regimes. 
Deep integration can be defined as agreements by governments to reduce the market 
segmenting effects of differences in national regulations by the coordination, harmonisation 
or mutual recognition of national laws, regulations and enforcement mechanisms.  We now 
proceed to discuss the EU approach to regulatory barriers, looking first at internal 
liberalisation and then at EU external policies in this area. We concentrate upon technical 
barriers to trade, which encompass sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and which remain 
one of the most important causes of market segmentation and which have been particularly 
important in recent EU bilateral trade policy initiatives.  
Technical barriers to trade (TBTs) can arise whenever a producer may have to alter its product 
in order to comply with differing partner country requirements such as for health, safety, 
environmental and consumer protection issues. These requirements can be imposed by both 
governmental (technical regulations) and non-governmental organisations (non-regulatory 
barriers, standards). The legal character of technical regulations distinguishes them from non- B RENTON AND MANCHIN 
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regulatory barriers or standards; namely, the latter are voluntary, not legally binding and arise 
from the self-interest of producers or consumers involved, for example, to improve the 
information in commercial transactions and ensure compatibility between products. The 
former mainly relates to either technical specifications or testing and certification 
requirements such that the product actually complies with the specifications to which it is 
subjected (conformity assessment). Technical regulations strike at the heart of business 
operations affecting business pre-production, production, sales and marketing policies. The 
need to adapt product design, re-organise production systems and perform multiple testing 
and certification can entail a significant cost (or technical trade barrier) for suppliers of 
exported goods to a particular country, the magnitude of which differs across products. Before 
moving on to look at regional initiatives regarding technical barriers to trade, it is worthwhile 
to briefly review the approaches that the EU has adopted to remove such barriers to internal 
trade amongst members. 
Instruments for removing technical barriers to trade 
EU policy related to standards, testing and certification requirements is currently based upon 
two approaches: enforcement of the mutual recognition principle (MRP) and if this fails, the 
harmonisation of technical standards in each member country. The core EU approach of 
mutual recognition is based upon the idea that a partner country’s regulations and conformity 
assessment mechanisms can offer equivalent levels of protection to those provided by 
corresponding domestic rules and procedures. Where ‘equivalence’ between levels of 
regulatory protection embodied in national regulations cannot be assumed, the only viable 
way to remove the TBT in question is for the member states to reach agreement on a common 
set of legally binding requirements. Currently, goods subject to harmonised regulations 
account for around 40 to 50% of intra-EU trade (Brenton et al. (2001)). Subsequently, no 
further legal impediments can prevent market access of complying products anywhere in the 
EU market. EU legislation harmonising technical specifications has involved two distinct 
approaches, the ‘old approach’ and the ‘new approach’.  
The old approach mainly applies to products by which the nature of the risk requires extensive 
product-by-product or even component-by-component legislation (chemicals, motor vehicles, 
pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs) and is carried out by means of detailed directives. In the 
main, achieving this type of harmonisation has been slow for two reasons. First of all, the 
process of harmonisation became highly technical since it sought to meet the individual 
requirements of each product category (including components). This resulted in extensive and 
drawn-out consultations. Secondly, the adoption of old-approach directives was based on 
unanimity in the Council.  As a result the harmonisation process proceeded extremely slowly. 
Indeed the approach was ineffective since new national regulations proliferated at a much 
faster rate than the production of EU level directives on a limited set of products (Pelkmans 
(1987)).  
It became increasingly recognised that there was a need to reduce the intervention of the 
public authorities prior to a product being placed on the market. Moreover, the decision-
making procedure needed to be adapted in order to facilitate the adoption of technical 
harmonisation directives by a qualified majority in the Council. This has been done by the 
adoption of the ‘new approach’ and applies to products, which have ‘similar characteristics’ 
and where there has been widespread divergence of technical regulations in EU countries. 
What makes this approach ‘new’ is that it only indicates ‘essential requirements’ and leaves 
greater freedom to manufacturers as to how to satisfy those requirements, dispensing with the 
‘old’ type of exhaustively detailed directives.   T RADE POLICY ISSUES FOR THE EURO-MED PARTNERSHIP 
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The new-approach directives provide for more flexibility than the detailed harmonisation 
directives of the old approach, by using the support of the established standardisation bodies, 
CEN, CENELEC and the national standard bodies. The standardisation work is achieved in a 
more efficient way, is easier to update and involves greater participation from industry. A 
further feature of the new approach is the use of market surveillance and the choice of 
attestation methods that are available: by self-certification against the essential requirements, 
by using generic standards or by using notified bodies for type approval and testing of 
conformity of type.  
Bilateral Agreements on Conformity Assessment 
Harmonisation and mutual recognition have been actively pursued by the EU in external 
bilateral agreements, not always in the context of a comprehensive trade agreement. The EU 
has no formal trade agreement with the US, but it does have a mutual recognition agreement 
(MRA) for conformity assessment of specific products. Under a MRA each country is given 
the authority to test and certify in its own territory, and prior to export, the conformity of 
products with the other country’s regulatory requirements.  The EU-US MRA agreement 
covers the following selected sectors: telecommunications equipment, electromagnetic 
compatibility, electrical safety, recreation craft, pharmaceutical good medical practices, and 
medical devices.  
Mutual recognition agreements can be expected to bring a number of benefits. In particular, 
the expense, time and unpredictability of obtaining approval can be reduced if the product can 
be tested for conformity in the country of production.  Unfortunately, at present we do not 
have good estimates of the impact that MRAs can have on the costs of exporting although 
some initial survey evidence from the OECD concludes that ‘mutual recognition agreements 
of conformity assessment procedures have had a distinct and beneficial effect on the costs of 
compliance’.  
The European Council has specified a list of priority countries with whom negotiations on 
MRAs should be conducted. The list comprises the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand, Hong Kong, Israel, Singapore, Philippines, China, South Africa, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Thailand and Turkey. To date the EU has signed agreements with the US, New 
Zealand, Australia and mostly recently in April 2002 with Japan. These agreements are 
confined to particular sectors and in the main the sectors covered by new-approach directives 
(or a subset of those sectors). Recently, the EU has signed Protocols on European Conformity 
Assessment with a number of Central and Eastern European countries as part of the process of 
accession to the EU.  
Two of the Mediterranean countries appear on the list of possible candidates for mutual 
recognition agreements with the EU: Turkey and Israel. Turkey is in the process of adopting a 
wide range of EU legislation in the area of technical standards and regulations which should 
ultimately lead to Turkey signing its own Protocol on European Conformity Assessment   
whilst Israel has already signed an Agreement on Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) which 
entered into force in May 2000. It is worth noting that elsewhere in the broad European 
economic space there is a trend towards the approximation of technical rules and regulations. 
It is interesting to compare the Association Agreements with Eastern applicant countries with 
the agreements of Mediterranean Partner Countries. While the approximation of laws is very 
important in the case of Central and Eastern European countries, it is not emphasised in the 
Association Agreements with Mediterranean Partner Countries. The laws of the eastern 
accession countries (including technical rules and standards) are in the process of 
harmonisation and approximation with those of the EU. To assist in achieving this objective  B RENTON AND MANCHIN 
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the EU provides technical assistance, which may include ‘the exchange of experts, the 
provision of early information especially on relevant legislation, organisation of seminars, 
training activities, aid for the translation of Community legislation in the relevant sectors.’ 
The Association Agreements with Mediterranean Partner Countries state that the partner 
countries should approximate their legislation to that of the EU in the areas covered by the 
Agreement. However the way this should be achieved is not covered by the agreements. For 
example in the case of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, the Agreements state that the 
‘cooperation shall be aimed at helping’ to bring the legislation closer to that of the 
Community. ‘While in the case of Lebanon and Jordan the Agreement states that ‘the Parties 
shall use their best endeavours to approximate their respective laws in order to facilitate the 
implementation of this Agreement’. In each Agreement there is an article on standards and 
conformity assessment. While the Association Agreements with Central and Eastern 
European countries envisage deeper objectives in this field with possible EU technical 
assistance, the Agreements with Mediterranean Partner Countries are more modest in certain 
cases without envisaging technical assistance. One of the most important differences is that 
Eastern European applicant countries are ‘encouraged’ to participate in the work of 
specialised organisations (such as CEN, Cenelec, ETSI, EOTC), while the possibility of 
participation in these organisations by Mediterranean countries is not mentioned in their 
Association Agreements.  
All the agreements with Mediterranean countries envisage agreements on mutual recognition, 
although only if it is ‘appropriate’ or ‘as soon as the conditions for them are met’. While the 
agreements with Eastern applicant countries state that the ‘cooperation shall seek to promote/ 
to support’ the use of EU technical regulations, the exchange of information in the field of 
quality control/production process, measurement and testing programmes, the Agreements 
with Mediterranean Partner Countries use slightly different language, in most of the cases 
stating that the ‘Parties shall cooperate’ in developing the use of Community rules in 
standardisation/conformity assessment, and developing the responsible bodies, etc.
5 The main 
objective in the area of standards and conformity assessment according to most of the 
Association Agreements between the EU and the Mediterranean countries is to reduce 
differences in standardisation and conformity assessment; the way to achieve these objectives, 
however, is not clearly defined. Thus, the agreements with the Mediterranean countries are 
constrained by a lack of ambition with regard to technical regulations and conformity 
assessment systems. 
What then can countries in the Mediterranean do to ensure that their exporters are able to 
effectively participate in the European-wide production networks that are developing and that 
require a degree of consistency in standards and regulations across countries. At the same 
time, there is a need to consider how to dismantle regulatory barriers to trade between 
Mediterranean countries. Firstly, there is a need to modernise standards on a range of 
exported products, including agricultural products. Where feasible it would make sense to 
adopt EU standards in areas where exports to the EU are important. There are useful 
experiences from Eastern Europe that countries in the region could draw upon. An example is 
provided by Bulgaria, which is well documented by Daskalov and Hadjikolonov (2002)). 
These authors point to two important steps that Bulgaria took in amending its system of 
technical rules and regulations and adopting EU rules. Firstly, Bulgaria’s legislators changed 
the status of Bulgarian standards from obligatory to voluntary.  The removal of the obligatory 
                                                           
5 The Association Agreements with Tunisia and Morocco add that ‘the Parties shall take appropriate steps to 
promote the use by Tunisia of Community technical rules and European standards for industrial and agri-food 
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status of the Bulgarski Dargaven Standart (BDS), the Bulgarian State Standard, made it 
possible for Bulgarian producers to immediately adopt European standards before they were 
formally introduced as BDS. This was a prerequisite for the adoption of the New Approach of 
the EU and also avoided the harmonisation process being hijacked and slowed down in the 
procedure of transposition by domestic interests seeking to remain protected behind domestic 
standards.  
The second key development was the practice of adopting European standards before having 
them translated into Bulgarian.  Such a practice dramatically speeded up the harmonisation of 
Bulgarian standards with those of the EU.  This does place the burden on producers and 
consumers to translate the EU standards, which de jure have been adopted by Bulgaria’s 
legislation, but de facto exist only in an electronic database in a foreign language. However, it 
avoids the situation that initially existed in Bulgaria whereby the majority of the BDS had not 
been harmonised such that Bulgarian producers who met the BDS could not have obtained a 
Certificate of Conformity to EU standards even if there had been an operating system of 
mutual recognition for the corresponding group of commodities. 
The adoption of harmonised European standards does not in itself remove all of the technical 
barriers to exports to the EU.  In addition, it is necessary to create the necessary institutional 
mechanisms to establish an appropriate system of voluntary product testing and certification 
and the accreditation of independent testing and certification bodies (Notified Bodies). This is 
a necessary step to allow products for export to the EU to be tested for conformity against EU 
regulations by domestic certification bodies. Notified bodies have to demonstrate the 
necessary level of independence, impartiality and integrity.  The competence of such bodies 
must be subject to surveillance and regular monitoring.  They must employ personnel with 
sufficient and relevant knowledge and experience.  
However, it is not necessary to notify such bodies in every industry sector.  The establishment 
of notified bodies is only necessary in important sectors with strong nation-wide 
representation. In other industry sectors, producers can use the conformity assessment 
services of foreign notified bodies in the EU countries or notified bodies in neighbouring 
countries that have signed a Mutual Recognition Agreement with the EU.
6 In this context, 
Turkey and Israel could develop as regional centres for testing and conformity assessment. In 
sectors where all countries in the region proceed to adopt EU standards, there would be a 
corresponding reduction in technical barriers to trade within the region. Again the benefits of 
the adoption of EU standards would be enhanced if countries were to recognise the results of 
testing and conformity assessment from the regional centres mentioned above. 
In sectors where the adoption of EU standards is not deemed to be relevant but where there is 
scope for intra-regional trade, countries in the region could investigate the potential for 
mutual recognition of regional partners’ regulations and standards. This would be appropriate 
in products where the risk to consumers is relatively small and attitudes to that risk and the 
way that it is regulated are similar. In short, there would be considerable benefits from 
adopting a regional approach to the issue of technical rules and standards, based upon the 
adoption of EU standards for the key products exported to the EU and the development of 
regional centres of excellence for testing and conformity assessment. 
 
                                                           
6 Provided that such an agreement does not contain rules of origin that restrict certification to domestically 
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Limited by rules: The role of rules of origin 
We suspect that one of the key factors limiting the impact of free trade agreements with the 
EU on industrial development and growth in the Mediterranean is likely to be the rules of 
origin stipulated by the EU, which act to constrain access to the EU market. Rules of origin 
are also at the heart of intra-regional integration between Mediterranean countries, both in 
terms of the impact of EU rules on trade between countries and the nature and resources being 
expended on negotiating rules of origin in free trade agreements between Mediterranean 
countries themselves. We now proceed to briefly outline the key issues regarding rules of 
origin before looking at specific aspects of the problem in the Mediterranean. 
Rules of origin define the conditions that a product must satisfy to be deemed as originating in 
the country from which preferential access is being sought. The main justification for rules of 
origin is to prevent trade deflection, whereby products from non-participating countries 
destined for say the EU market are redirected through free trade partners of the EU to avoid 
the payment of customs duties.  Similar reasoning applies to the need for rules of origin in the 
EU’s free trade partner. When products are produced in a single stage, then the origin of the 
products should be relatively easy to establish. Proof that the product was produced in the free 
trade partner should be sufficient. For all other cases the rules of origin define the methods by 
which it can be ascertained that the product has undergone sufficient working or processing in 
the free trade partner to qualify for preferential access. 
The specification of rules of origin has become particularly important in recent years as 
technological progress and globalisation have led to the increasing fragmentation of the 
production process into different stages or tasks that are undertaken in different locations.  A 
number of general approaches to origin are available. The simplest way of defining origin is 
probably change of tariff heading, alternatively there can be rules relating to the amount of 
domestic value-added or to specific technical requirements that the product may satisfy.  
In the EU’s bilateral trade agreements the basic rule that it adopts is that of the change in tariff 
heading at the 4-digit level of the CN or HS. However, in a very large number of cases this 
basic rule is supplanted by often restrictive specific requirements. For example, with the basic 
rule of change in tariff heading, a country that imports woven cotton fabric (HS 5208) to 
produce cotton shirts (610510) would satisfy the rule of origin and qualify for preferential 
reduction of the tariff on cotton shirts. However, in EU free trade agreements the change of 
tariff classification is replaced with a requirement that the product has been manufactured 
from Yarn. In effect this imposes the requirement that two stages of production must be 
undertaken in the partner or qualifying area to confer origin – not only the sewing together of 
the fabric but also the production of the fabric itself. Clothing products made in free trade 
partners of the EU but which are made-up of fabrics imported from third countries, such as 
China, will not satisfy the EU origin rules and will not qualify for tariff reduction. 
Thus in EU trade agreements, annexes specify, for listed products, requirements other than 
change in tariff classification.  These other requirements can be a minimum percentage of 
local value added in the originating country, or a technical requirement that requires that the 
product undergoes specific manufacturing operations in the country. In general the value-
added criterion is very rarely applied, the specific requirements listed in the annex mainly 
define technical requirements. The technical requirements defined in the annexes are more 
specific and more restrictive than the change in tariff-heading rule. In the case of textiles, 
clothing and footwear, the annexes never specify value-added requirements, and only lay 
down technical requirements. In a typical agreement, a change in tariff heading is sufficient to 
confer origin for only about 15% of the textile product headings, while for the remaining 85%  T RADE POLICY ISSUES FOR THE EURO-MED PARTNERSHIP 
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of headings, specific technical requirements to qualify for preferential access must be met.
7 In 
the case of clothing, for 95% of the products categories, the rules do not permit change of 
heading but require specific working and processing. Similarly for footwear, most of the 
products have to fulfil technical requirements.  
Brenton and Manchin (2003) highlight that a substantial proportion of EU imports that are 
eligible for preferential access under the GSP do not receive preferential access to the EU. 
The rules of origin in the GSP are very similar to those in the EU’s free trade agreements, 
including those with the Central and Eastern European Countries – for example, to qualify for 
duty reductions, clothing products must be made from yarn.   Further, they note that a 
substantial proportion of EU imports of clothing products from the Central and Eastern 
European countries enters the EU through an alternative customs scheme, known as outward 
processing trade (OPT), even though with duty-free access there is no fiscal incentive to use 
this scheme. In the absence of alternative explanations they conclude that registering for OPT 
is a lower cost mechanism for ensuring duty-free access to the EU than complying with the 
rules of origin. This suggests that, whilst on the one hand it is difficult to satisfy the precise 
requirements of EU rules of origin, it is also costly to meet the administrative requirements of 
proving origin. The costs of proving origin may exceed the benefits, in terms of duty 
reduction. We suspect that rules of origin cause Mediterranean exporters similar problems in 
gaining access to the EU markets, although it would appear that there is less scope for using 
OPT as a means of overcoming these problems. 
Herin (1986) found that the costs for EFTA producers of proving origin led to one-quarter of 
EFTA exports to the EU paying the applied most favoured nation (MFN) duties. The costs of 
proving origin may be even higher, and possibly prohibitive, in countries where customs 
mechanisms are poorly developed. Thus, even when producers can satisfy the EU’s rules of 
origin, in terms of meeting the technical requirements, they may not receive preferential 
access to the EU because the customs authorities do not accept their proof of origin or 
because the costs of proving origin are high relative to the duty reduction that is available.   
What can be done to attenuate the restrictiveness of the rules of origin that the Mediterranean 
countries have to satisfy to attain duty-free access to the EU market? Cumulation of rules of 
origin is one mechanism that can be used in this context. Typically, agreements with the EU 
allow for bilateral cumulation with the EU so that originating inputs, that is, materials that 
have been produced in accordance with the relevant rules of origin, imported from the EU 
qualify as originating materials when used in the partner country’s exports to the EU. 
However, the EU is often not the least-cost supplier of inputs and so the benefits of this type 
of cumulation are limited.
8 Of greater relevance would be to allow diagonal cumulation on a 
regional basis so that qualifying materials from anywhere in the region could be used without 
undermining duty-free access to the EU. In other words, parts and materials from anywhere in 
the region that qualify as originating could be used in the manufacture of a final product 
which could then be exported duty free to the EU. Finally, there can be full cumulation 
whereby any processing activities carried out in any participating country can be counted as 
qualifying content regardless of whether the processing is sufficient to confer originating 
status to the materials themselves.  
                                                           
7 The amount of trade covered by technical requirements will typically be higher since the weaker requirement of 
simply change of tariff heading will tend to apply to product headings where there is an insignificant amount of 
trade. 
8 If the extra cost of using EU sourced inputs rather than the lowest cost inputs from elsewhere exceeds the 
available benefit from duty-free access, then cumulation will have no effect and there will be no improvement in 
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Currently, the Barcelona process is seeking to establish a Euro-Med free trade area by 2010 
with diagonal cumulation based upon the adoption of EU rules of origin throughout the 
region. The objective is the integration of the east Mediterranean countries into the so-called 
pan-European cumulation area. As a prerequisite to integrate the Mediterranean Partner 
Countries into the cumulation area, the EU is demanding the harmonisation of rules of origin. 
This requirement of harmonisation with EU rules of origin is inevitably slowing down the 
pace of integration in the region. Harmonisation of rules of origin is not a necessary condition 
for the implementation of diagonal cumulation and indeed there are examples, such as the 
GSP, where the EU provides for limited regional cumulation without the necessity of 
harmonising rules of origin. Thus, the EU could quickly adopt a more liberal approach to 
rules of origin in the Mediterranean region by more quickly allowing for regional cumulation. 
This move in itself will provide an impetus to regional integration as producers in the 
Mediterranean countries search for regional sources of materials which will qualify for 
preferential treatment and will stimulate exports to the EU.  
In the longer term, the EU should consider how to apply full cumulation of rules of origin 
throughout the region. Full cumulation would allow more fragmentation of production 
processes among the members of the free trade area and so stimulate increased economic 
linkages and trade within the region. Some argue that under full cumulation more developed 
countries can outsource labour-intensive low-tech production stages to less developed 
partners and lock them into these stages therefore ‘blocking’ a more general process of 
development. It is argued that diagonal cumulation will stimulate more capital-intensive 
production processes and investments by requiring more stages of production/higher value-
added to be undertaken in the country to fulfil the requirements of rules of origin and obtain 
preferences. The experience of developing countries under the GSP scheme shows, however, 
that requiring high levels of value-added or multiple processing stages to be undertaken 
results in lower uptakes of preferences and a lower level of all activities in the country.  
Full cumulation is already granted between Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, but these countries 
can only take advantage of the full cumulation rule if they are trading within themselves. 
Thus, including only three countries from the region in the full cumulation area does not 
encourage trade with other countries in the region outside the full cumulation area. In order to 
achieve deeper economic linkages between the countries in the region, full cumulation should 
be extended to other countries in the region.  
4.  The Geography of Achieving Broad and Deep Integration in the Mediterranean 
How should the EU and countries in the Mediterranean region pursue this broadening – to 
cover agriculture and services – and deepening – to reduce the problems caused by different 
regulations and standards – of existing agreements and achieve effective integration with the 
EU and between countries in the region in such a way that higher growth and prosperity are 
actually delivered. 
Firstly, it is worth noting that the Barcelona group consists of diverse countries whose 
relationships with the EU and amongst each other are dramatically changing. For a start 
Cyprus and Malta will shortly be acceding to the EU. Secondly, and most importantly, 
Turkey, whilst a member of the Barcelona group, actually applies the common customs policy 
of the EU and, in principle, should be involved in the formulation of EU external trade policy 
in goods and certain services. In addition, Turkey is in the process of adopting a large amount 
of EU legislation. Of particular relevance here are the process of technical harmonisation and 
establishing the conditions for mutual recognition, the adoption of EU competition rules and 
planned negotiations on services. Israel too is placed in a special position in the region, in part  T RADE POLICY ISSUES FOR THE EURO-MED PARTNERSHIP 
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because it is economically more advanced and in a number of ways has regulatory structures 
similar to those of the EU. As a result, participation in the EEA is one possible route for 
further integration with the EU. 
Turkey at present appears to be a dislocated part of the EU trade policy hub relative to the 
Mediterranean spokes. Turkey applies the common trade policy in goods but plays little or no 
role in defining that policy. Peers (1996) argues that ‘Turkey cannot affect the revision or 
negotiation of new trade agreements, and is explicitly excluded from consultation when the 
EU adopts trade policy measures against third states – even though the Decision suggests that 
the EC and Turkey should attempt to act in tandem on such measures’.
9  
The marginalisation of Turkey in defining and implementing EU commercial policies in the 
Mediterranean is a major weakness of the current Barcelona process. Mechanisms should be 
found which strengthen the role of Turkey as a regional economic hub, offsetting to some 
extent the single hub and spoke centred on the EU, and as a force for modernisation in the 
region through the increasing adoption of EU technical regulations and standards. This is 
likely to entail, however, an accentuation of sub-regionalism in the Mediterranean with 
Turkey being the focus of an increasing drive towards liberalisation in the Mashreq with the 
Maghreb countries still focused on the Southern EU.  This tendency could be offset to some 
extent if the EU were to promptly allow for diagonal cumulation of rules of origin throughout 
the whole of the Mediterranean region. 
Efforts towards increasingly deep integration in the eastern Mediterranean region could 
revolve around Turkey and Israel
10 becoming regional focal points for testing and conformity 
assessment for products being sold both in the EU and within the Mediterranean region. 
Products produced in regional neighbours would, provided the EU does not impose rules of 
origin, be able to be tested for conformity with EU rules in Turkey or Israel and not require 
further testing in the EU. This could, in principle, apply to sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations as well as regulations governing health and safety of consumer and industrial 
goods. 
In this process of regional integration, there is a need to consider the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC).
11 In 1989 the EC and the GCC concluded a Cooperation Agreement which 
contains a commitment to start negotiations concerning a free trade agreement. The EU 
conditions the signature of such an agreement on the establishment of a GCC Customs Union. 
In 2001 the GCC countries decided to advance the establishment of the customs union by two 
years, with the GCC Customs Union expected now to be established by 2003. The EU and the 
GCC have recently restarted their discussions concerning an EU-GCC free trade agreement. 
In this context and with the importance of the GCC, it would be useful to consider the gains 
from including the GCC in the Barcelona process – particularly a process that revolves around 
Turkey becoming a centre and leading player in the modernisation and integration of the 
eastern Mediterranean region. Integrating the EU-GCC free trade area with the free trade area 
of the Mediterranean Partner Countries could give a stimulus to deeper regional Arab 
cooperation. 
The GCC countries have the most developed financial markets in the region, as a result of 
their oil wealth, and could be substantial investors throughout the region if barriers to 
                                                           
9 The Decision referred to is Decision 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council which created the EC-Turkey 
Customs Union. 
10 If Israel joins the EEA or a Mutual Recognition Agreement is negotiated with the EU. 
11 The Gulf Cooperation Council was created in 1981 by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab 
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investment and trade were demolished and the incentive to investment improved. The 
integration of the GCC into the Barcelona process could provide a strong push towards 
freeing trade between the Gulf and the Mediterranean countries and in promoting regional 
cooperation (Bertelsmann Foundation (2002)).    
Table 3 shows the web of trade agreements concluded between Mediterranean countries. 
Several east Mediterranean countries and GCC countries are members of the FTA of the Arab 
League which would facilitate the inclusion of the GCC countries in the Mediterranean Free 
Trade Area. It also implies that there are some economic linkages between the Mediterranean 
and Gulf region which should be further promoted by the creation of an EU-Mediterranean 
FTA. 
Table 3. Trade agreements of Mediterranean Partner Countries 
Partner 
countries  Morocco Algeria Tunisia Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria Turkey  Libya PLO
Morocco  AMU  AL, AMU AL, X AL AL   AMU, AL
Algeria AMU   AMU X
a  AMU
Tunisia  AL, AMU AMU  AL, X AL AL   AMU
Egypt  AL, X   AL, X AL X AL   AL X
Israel   X
a X 
Jordan AL,  X X
a AL,  X
b AL X
a AL X AL X
Lebanon   X X  
Syria AL   AL AL AL X   AL
Turkey   X X   
Libya AMU,  AL AMU  AL,  AMU AL AL AL  
PLO   X X  
a Source: US and Foreign Commercial Service. 
b Signed but not implemented. 
Notes: AMU = Arab-Maghreb Union – signed in 1989, envisages free trade between Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco and Tunisia. Not implemented. 
AL = FTA of Arab League, in force from 1998; envisages reductions in industrial tariffs over a 10-year period. 
Includes Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, 
Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait and Libya.  
X= Bilateral Trade Agreement. 
Sources: European Commission, various national sources and US Trade Information Center Regional Database. 
 
Thus, the overall goal of the revitalised Barcelona process should be the integration of all 
countries in the region into the European-wide economic space that is being constructed 
which will include the current EU members, the Central and Eastern European countries, the 
countries of the Balkans, the EFTA countries and Northern European countries including 
Russia and Ukraine. This will be an economic space based upon similar approaches to 
standards and conformity assessment for industrial goods and agricultural products and 
similar regulatory approaches to establishment and the provision of services. This in turn will 
further stimulate the creation of European-wide production networks across the whole of the 
region. The inclusion of Mediterranean countries in such an area will require substantial 
changes in economic policies with an emphasis on harmonisation with EU rules and 
regulations and the liberalisation of sectors, particular services, which have previously been 
excluded from integration initiatives in the region.  
This process of adaptation should commence immediately. There are also a number of policy 
measures that can be taken quickly to enhance and support the process of integration between  T RADE POLICY ISSUES FOR THE EURO-MED PARTNERSHIP 
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the EU and the Mediterranean and within the region itself. Firstly, there is a need to liberalise 
trade in agricultural products. Secondly, there should be concerted attempts throughout the 
region to modernise regulations relating to sanitary and phytosanitary standards, with 
appropriate support from the EU. Thirdly, for industrial goods, countries in the region should 
quickly adopt EU regulations for key products exported to the EU. The EU should move 
quickly to negotiate and support agreements on mutual recognition of testing and conformity 
assessment in Turkey and Israel, without rules of origin. Fourthly, the EU should allow for 
diagonal cumulation of rules of origin throughout the region. If this is not deemed to be 
politically feasible, then the EU should allow for the simplification or derogation from 
restrictive rules of origin on key products in Mediterranean countries’ exports to the EU, such 
as clothing products.  
5.  Conclusions 
Trade agreements have had little impact on growth and poverty alleviation in the 
Mediterranean region. A key reason for this is that agreements between the EU and countries 
of the region and agreements within the region have been limited in scope and ambition. 
Significant sectors have been excluded and the agreements have been shallow in terms of the 
range of regulatory barriers to trade that have been addressed. It is time now to think how the 
Barcelona process can be made more effective in stimulating trade, growth and poverty 
reduction. This paper argues that a necessary condition will be to broaden and deepen 
liberalisation in the area. This will require a bold commitment to reform and acceptance of the 
inevitable adjustment costs that will arise. Here there is an important role of the EU and the 
governments of the region in devising and implementing appropriate policies to dampen this 
impact and facilitate the reorganisation of resources that will be required. Only a clear and 
visible commitment to achieve liberalisation and promote and protect open market access for 
all firms in the region and the EU will lead to a genuine change in attitude of traders and 
investors towards the region.  
We finish by summarising our specific proposals: 
•  Include all agricultural products in agreements with the EU and in those between 
Mediterranean countries. 
•  Be bold in liberalising trade in services. 
•  Be ambitious in making progress on the removal of technical barriers to trade;  
o  the Mediterranean countries should allow for the voluntary adoption of EU standards,  
o  emphasis should be given to allowing the development of regional centres of 
excellence (initially in Turkey and Israel) for conformity assessment – the certificates 
from which should be recognised throughout the whole of the region. 
•  Diagonal cumulation of rules of origin should be quickly permitted throughout the whole 
of the region without the need for the harmonisation with EU rules of origin. An objective 
of full cumulation of rules of origin should be clearly stated. 
•  There should be greater involvement of Turkey in EU trade policy-making towards the 
region. 
•  The GCC talks should be connected to the Barcelona process and if possible liberalisation 
should occur on a parallel track.  18 
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ANNEX 1 
KEY FEATURES OF EU TRADE WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES 
EU trade with the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs)* (billions of euro) 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Imports  26.6 27.8 28.2 28.0 30.5 32.1 35.3 41.3 42.5 47.2 64.7 67.4 
Exports  33.5 35.0 36.6 43.5 43.9 50.6 56.9 65.3 68.0 69.4 87.0 75.3 
Share of imports to 
MPCs in total imports  5.8% 5.6% 5.8% 5.7% 5.7% 5.9% 6.1% 6.2% 6.0% 6.1% 6.3% 6.6%
Share of exports to 
MPCs in total exports  8.1% 8.3% 8.4% 8.9% 8.1% 8.8% 9.1% 9.1% 9.3% 9.1% 9.3% 7.7%
* MPCs: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 
 
Share of the EU in the external trade of the MPCs in 2000 
 Tunisia  Morocco  Algeria  Turkey  Malta Cyprus Syria Lebanon* Israel Egypt Jordan  P.  A.* Total 
Imports 71.6%  57.9%  58.0%  48.9% 60.0% 51.6% 29.6%  45.9% 43.3% 34.1% 33.0%  15.4% 47.5%
Exports 80.0%  74.7%  62.7%  52.5% 33.4% 36.5% 65.0%  24.1% 27.2% 40.0%  3.3% 0.4%  48.4%
Total 75.0% 64.5% 61.2%  50.1%  48.8% 48.6% 48.6%  43.8% 35.8% 35.6% 25.6%  13.5% 47.8%
* 1999 data. 
Source: Eurostat.  21 
ANNEX 2 
COMPARISON OF SELECTED PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS WITH THE EU 
 
  Turkey  EEA  CEECs  Israel  MPCs* 
Tariff free, 
industrial 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  To go to zero 
Common external 
tariff, industrial 
EU CET  ----  ----  ----  ---- 
Removal of 
quotas, industrial 
Fully, but 
conditional on 
IPR, state aids for 
clothing 
Fully Fully  Fully,  except 
some foodstuffs 
(e.g. pasta) 
Mostly 
Tariff free, 
agriculture 
Ad-valorem 
duties mostly to 
zero; specific 
duties sometimes 
reduced; tariff 
quotas (also 
seasonal) 
Only 
some 
reduction 
Some 
reductions 
Ad-valorem 
duties mostly to 
zero; specific 
duties remains 
Reduction 
(negotiable) 
Removal of 
quotas, agro 
To be negotiated; 
T. yo adopt some 
CAP measures 
(Tariffied
) 
Many tariff 
quotas remain 
Mostly in fruits 
& vegetables; 
new negoti-
ations in 2000 
Some left 
Common tariffs, 
agro 
--------- ---------  ---------  ------- ------- 
Transition period 
tariff removal 
(22 years up to 
1996) (unknown 
for agro) 
(4 years 
in the 
1970s) 
Asymmetric; 
EU 5 years, 
CEECs 10 years 
(As of 1975, 
Israel 10 years 
plus 4 years 
delay; EU 4 
years) 
Asymmetric; 
MED up to 12 
years 
Customs 
cooperation 
EU customs rules 
is largely adopted 
Some Yes  Some  Some 
Technical 
harmonisation 
and mutual 
recognition 
Adoption of EU 
acquis  
EU 
acquis 
adopted 
Approximation 
of EU acquis  
Agreement on 
good laboratory 
practices signed 
Open-ended 
approxima-
tion objective 
Origin rules  EU origin rules   EU origin 
rules   
EU origin rules   Adoption of EU 
origin rules   
Adoption of 
EU origin 
rules 
Safeguards and 
anti-dumping 
(=AD) 
Only after ‘early 
warning’ 
Practicall
y 
excluded 
Only after 
consultation 
Yes Yes 
Services  To be negotiated  EU 
acquis 
adopted 
EU acquis 
(mainly)  
adopted 
GATS, plus 
vague objective 
GATS only 
Establishment & 
national treatment 
Under negotiation  EU 
acquis 
(except 
oil/gas) 
EU acquis 
(mainly) 
adopted 
Provision on 
freedom of 
establishment; 
to be further 
negotiated 
Objective 
only (with 
some 
exceptions for 
Jordan) 
Intellectual 
property rights 
Trips 
immediately; EU 
acquis step-by-
step;  
EU 
acquis 
adopted 
EU acquis 
(mainly) 
adopted 
Little beyond 
trips, to be 
negotiated 
Little beyond 
TRIPS; will 
provide 
suitable and 
effective 
protection 
  B RENTON AND MANCHIN 
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  Turkey  EEA  CEECs  Israel  MPCs* 
(EC) competition 
rules 
EU acquis to be 
adopted; T. 
established 
competition 
authority 
EU acquis 
adopted 
To introduce 
basic EU 
acquis + 
competition 
authority 
Fairly general 
competition 
obligation; annual 
state aids report; 
to be futher 
negotiated 
To respect 
EU policy 
guidelines; 
cooperation 
and 
coordination 
Free movement 
of capital 
Adoption of EU 
acquis 
EU acquis 
adopted 
EU acquis 
(mainly)  
adopted 
Conditional 
freedom + 
safeguard 
No; no 
special FDI 
protection  
Financial aid  Yes   Norway pays 
for cohesion 
Yes Yes  (also 
Palestine) 
Yes 
‘Economic’ 
(project) 
cooperation 
Some ----  PHARE  & 
other 
cooperation 
Some Some 
Political/cultural 
cooperation 
Some (in 
Association 
framework) 
----- Extensive  (in 
Association 
framework 
and beyond) 
Some Some 
Institutions Intergovernmenta
l under 
Association 
Common 
court; 
intergovernme
ntal bodies 
Intergovernm
ental under 
Association; 
access to EU 
Council 
Intergovernmenta
l under 
Association 
Intergovern-
mental 
under 
Association 
 
* MPCs: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. 
Source: Pelkmans and Brenton (1999). 
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ANNEX 3 
THE FIVE MOST IMPORTANT AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS IN 2000 TO THE EU BY 
MEDITERRANEAN PARTNER COUNTRIES AND THE LEVEL OF EU PROTECTION 
(THOUSANDS OF EURO) 
Morocco 
Product EU  imports  Tariff 
Tomatoes   117,222 3.5%
a 
Octopus   93,726 0% 
Fresh navels etc   59,015 0.60%  
Clementines   57,521 13.60%
a,b 
Sardines   52,832 0% 
 
 
Algeria 
Product   EU imports  Tariff 
Dates 15,593 5.3%
a,b 
Shrimps and prawns  3,210 0% 
Grapes   2,190 €13.1/hl
a,c  
Wine   1,630 €9.9/hl
a,c 
Frozen shrimps and prawns  771 0% 
 
 
Tunisia 
Product EU  imports  Tariff 
Lampante virgin olive oil  105,630 €122.6/100 kg
a,c 
Virgin olive oil and fractions (excl. Lampante)  73,853 €124.5/100 kg
c 
Fresh or dried dates  50,755 4.2%
b 
Frozen shrimps   42,058 0% 
Frozen shrimps and prawns,  13,662 0% 
 
 
Egypt 
Product EU  imports  Tariff 
New potatoes   29,731 6.3%
a,d 
Beans   19,440 4.3% min €0.6/100 kg
a
Cane molasses   14,020 €0.35/100 kg  
Dried onions  13,463 15% 
Plants and parts of plants   10,630 0%  
 
 
Israel 
Product EU  imports  Tariff 
Fresh cut flowers and buds  73,423 8.5%
a,c 
Avocados 53,593 0% 
Grapefruit 35,913 1.5%
a,c 
Sweet peppers   33,539 4.3%
a  
Vegetable seed for sowing  29,220 3%
c  B RENTON AND MANCHIN 
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Jordan 
Product EU  imports Tariff 
Cucumbers   1,363 12.8%
a,c  
Fruits of genus capsicum or pimenta  764 0% 
Beans   355 0%
a,b 
Tomatoes   336 0%
a 
Fresh or chilled vegetables n.e.s.   204 8.9%
a,b 
 
 
Lebanon 
Product EU  imports  Tariff 
Guts, bladders and stomachs of animals  6,907 0%
c 
Wine of fresh grapes  2,274 €13.1/hl
a,c 
Wine   1,562 €15.4/hl
a,c 
Chewing gum   1,513
0 % + €30.9/100 kg 
max 18.2
a 
Coffee (excl. Roasted and decaffeinated)   505 0%
c 
 
 
Syria 
Product EU  imports  Tariff 
Guts, bladders and stomachs of animals   17,242 0%
c 
Cumin seeds  3,967 0%
c 
Cotton linters  3,652 0%
c 
New potatoes   2,759 8.9%
a,b 
Capers   2,534 4%
a,b 
 
 
Turkey 
Product EU  imports  Tariff 
Hazelnuts, shelled and peeled   382,627 3% 
Sultanas   150,513 0% 
Sun-cured oriental type tobacco   128,001 0% 
Dried figs  54,575 0% 
Dried apricots   52,990 0% 
 
 
Cyprus 
Product EU  imports  Tariff 
New potatoes   26,985 0%
a,d 
Citrus hybrids   8,881 13.6%
a,b,e 
Grapefruit 6,232 0% 
Vermouth   5,477 0% 
Fresh table grapes   4,649
Standard import value 
€112.2/100kg 
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Malta 
Product EU  imports  Tariff 
Gilt-head seabreams ‘sparus aurata’  4,399 15%
c 
New potatoes   3,007 0%
a,e 
Sunflower seeds   1,939 0%
c 
Sea bass ‘dicentrarchus labrax’   622 15%
c 
Tomato ketchup and other tomato sauces   576 0% 
a Seasonally changing entry tariffs, the lowest tariff is indicated.   
b Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). 
c Applicable to all third-party countries. 
d For some seasons the GSP rate applies. 
e For some seasons, the third-party country rate applies. 
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ANNEX 4. EU IMPORTS IN 2000 (THOUSANDS OF EURO) 
 Morocco  Algeria  Tunisia  Egypt  Israel  Jordan Lebanon  Syria  Turkey  Cyprus  Malta 
Imports 1,162,963  29,126 374,555 157,900 817,944 4,816 19,759 39,670 1,924,192 98,124 12,528  Food 
products 
(sections I-
IV)
% of total 
imports 
19% 0% 7% 5% 8% 3% 10% 1% 11% 10% 1% 
Imports 510,957  12,021,781 513,799 155,6268 261,840 6,502 15,649 3,011,922 614,277 42,701 66,152  Mineral 
products 
(section VI) % of total 
imports 
9% 73% 9% 46% 3% 4% 8% 88% 4% 4% 7% 
Imports 2,457,149  571 2,709,206 678,831 503,391 21,508 18,020 277,331 7,460,301 67,757 155,184  Textiles 
(section XI)
% of total 
imports 
41% 0% 50% 20% 5% 12% 9% 8% 43% 7% 15% 
Imports 35,533  935 9647 19,327 1,994,540 3,130 31,586 352 79,206 5,151 3,562  Stones etc. 
(XIV)
% of total 
imports 
1% 0% 0% 1% 20% 2% 15% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
Imports 148,201  79,768 103,499 290470 395,302 4,946 36,964 6,750 1,392,545 25,371 19,977  Metals (XV)
% of total 
imports 
2% 0% 2% 9% 4% 3% 18% 0% 8% 3% 2% 
Imports 607,106  19,448 799,269 219,657 2,762,785 26,172 19,055 12,339 2,378,826 63,348 363,877  Machinery 
(XVI)
% of total 
imports 
10% 0% 15% 7% 28% 15% 9% 0% 14% 6% 36% 
Imports 183,666  66,602 162,001 62,989 128,717 48,629 4,641 4,957 1,614,760 596,322 107,633  Vehicles 
(XVII)
% of total 
imports 
3% 0% 3% 2% 1% 27% 2% 0% 9% 60% 11% 
Imports 28,520  2116 56,380 37,320 675,722 27,283 2,343 4,470 54,634 30,088 51,298  Optical 
products 
(XVIII) % of total 
imports 
0% 0% 1% 1% 7% 15% 1% 0% 0% 3% 5% 
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